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NOTES
Judicial Creation of Direct Actions Against Automobile Liability
Insurers: Shingleton v. Bussey*
I.

INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL SETTING

Elizabeth R. Bussey commenced a negligence action in a Florida

state trial court against Frances R.B. Shingleton for damages sustained
in an automobile mishap. The accident itself was a rather ordinary
rear-end collision. Out of the ordinary, however, was the fact that the

plaintiff joined as a party defendant Shingleton's liability insurer,
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. The trial judge, following the

insurance policy's non-joinder provisions' and the weight of authority

in Florida2 and elsewhere, 3 granted Nationwide's motion that it be

dismissed as a party defendant. Plaintiff appealed this order to the
Florida District Court of Appeal on the theory that, as a third-party
beneficiary to defendant Shingleton's liability insurance contract with

Nationwide, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure permitted joinder of
Nationwide as a real party in interest. Sustaining this contention, the
court of appeal reversed the trial court's order of dismissal.' On
certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida, held, affirmed. Prevailing

public policy demands that members of the general public be regarded
as third-party beneficiaries of automobile liability insurance contracts

and that the interest of the insurer in a suit against its insured be
* This note was awarded the Edmund M. Morgan prize for the outstanding piece of student
writing submitted to the Vanderbilt Law Review during the year.
1. A typical provision may be found in Allstate's standard policy: "No action shall lie
against Allstate until after full compliance with all the terms of this policy nor . . until the
amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by judgment
against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant and
Allstate." Allstate Crusader Policy 16. See Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy: Some Of
The Changes, 33 INS. COUNSEL J. 223, 232 (1966).
2. Jones v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 19 F. Supp. 799 (N.D. Fla. 1937); Miami
Jockey Club v. Union Assurance Soc'y, 12 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Fla. 1935), affd, 82 F.2d 588
(5th Cir. 1936); Artille v. Davidson, 126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936), affd sub nom., State ex
rel. Davidson v. Parks, 129 Fla. 64, 175 So. 792 (1937); Thompson v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America,
199 So. 2d 113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Hayes v. Thomas, 161 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist.-Ct.
App. 1964); Canal Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, 114 So. 2d 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), affd, 122 So.
2d 313 (Fla. 1960).

3. 44 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 1575 (1969); 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
§ 4861 (1962); 12 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 45:763 (R. Anderson ed. 1964).

AND

PRACTICE

4. Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So. 2d 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), noted in 23 U.
L. REv. 652 (1968).
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recognized as sufficient to permit its joinder as a real party in interest
despite contract provisions to the contrary. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223"
So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
In view of existing precedent,6 these two appellate decisions
reversed a long-standing judicial trend in the treatment of liability
insurers in personal injury litigation. While there are a number of states
that have provided by statute for direct actions against such insurers,7
the instant case is the first to permit joinder wholly without statutory
authorization. These decisions, which were strenuously contested by the
insurance industry,8 bring into focus the conflicting policies and
arguments which have surrounded the development of direct actions.
To provide the necessary background for examining this policy
conflict, Part II will present a survey of the current status of direct
actions in all their forms throughout the American jurisdictions while
Part III will present an analysis of the Shingleton opinions. Against
this background Parts IV and V will present an assessment of the
significance of the instant case, an exploration of the potential problem
areas likely to be encountered in the future application of Shinglelon,
and a suggestion of possible approaches to the difficulties raised.
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF DIRECT ACTIONS
In addition to Florida's judicially authorized direct action, a
considerable number of other American jurisdictions statutorily permit
varying forms of direct action against insurers. These statutes,
compiled in this section, proceed from those which are most
comprehensive to those which are most limited.
A.

Comprehensive Direct Action Statutes

The direct action statutes enjoying the widest renown are those of
Louisiana9 and Wisconsin.10 In Louisiana, the insurer may be joined as
5. Noted in 43 FLA. B.J. 570 (1969); 22 U.
6. See notes 2-3 supra.

FLA.

L. REV. 145 (1969).

7. See notes 9-44 infra and accompanying text.
8. Appearing as amicus curiae were the American Insurance Association, the American
Mutual Insurance Alliance, the National Association of Independent Insurors, the Federation of
Insurance Counsel, and the Florida Defense Lawyers Association. 223 So. 2d at 714.

9.

LA. REv.

STAT.

§ 22:655 (Supp. 1970), constitutionalityupheld in Watson v. Employers

Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); see Moorhead v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 152 F. Supp.
131 (S.D. Fla.), affd, 248 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1957) (impairment of contracts objection applies
only to legislative acts). See generally 22 LA. L. REv. 243 (1961); 13 LA. L. REV. 495 (1953).
10. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 260.11 (Supp. 1969). See MacDonald, Direct Action Against
Liability Insurance Companies, 1957 Wis. L. REV. 612.
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a party defendant with the insured or sued alone in the case of an
accident occurring within the state, regardless of where the insurance
policy was issued or delivered. Moreover, the terms of the statute do
not limit its application to automobile accidents; all liability insurers
are within its compass. Wisconsin, on the other hand, expressly limits
the scope of its statute to insurers of motor vehicles and to injuries
involving such vehicles. Unlike Louisiana, the accident need not occur
in Wisconsin unless the insurance policy sued upon was issued or
delivered outside of Wisconsin.
Important but less well-known direct action statutes are in force
in the island territories of Puerto Rico" and Guam."2 Puerto Rico
permits direct action against any casualty insurer alone or jointly with
the insured without limitation as to the type of accident. Likewise in
Guam, any liability insurer may be sued alone or jointly, but contrary
to the general trend of American authority, the action abates upon the
3
death of the insured.1
A fifth jurisdiction, Alabama, has a Motor Vehicle SafetyResponsibility Act which has been interpreted to permit direct suit
against motor vehicle insurers. 14 The case so interpreting, however,
involved a motor carrier for hire and was further complicated by
master-servant and subrogation issues which may well have reduced the
significance of the case as declarative of Alabama law on the subject.
For this reason Alabama may be better classified under the following
section relating to carriers for hire.
B.

Direct Actions Against Insurersof Motor Carriersfor Hire

Almost every state recognizes the existence of a special
relationship between the general public and carriers for hire. Nine
states have carried this recognition to the point of permitting joinder
of the carrier's insurer in an action brought for damage sustained in
an accident involving the carrier. The rationale commonly given for
this position is that since statutes or ordinances require these carriers
to post insurance or indemnity bonds, this protective coverage inures
1I.
12.

P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, §§ 2001 (1958), 2003 (Supp. 1968).
GOV'T CODE § 23525, 43354 (1961). Pertinent portions of the statute may be

GUAM

found in Capital Ins. & Sur. Co. v. Kelly, 361 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1025 (1967).
13. Capital Ins. & Sur. Co. v. Kelly, 361 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1025 (1967).
14. ALA. CoDE tit. 36, §§ 74(62)-(83) (1959) and (Supp. 1968), construed in American S.
Ins. Co. v. Dime Taxi Serv., Inc., 275 Ala. 51, 151 So. 2d 783 (1963).
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directly to the benefit of the public. The requirement of financial
responsibility is also regarded as tending to lessen or eliminate potential
jury prejudice because jurors are presumably aware of the compulsory
law.' s
The statutes of four states, Georgia,"0 Oklahoma,' 17 South
Carolina 8 and Vermont, 9 specifically provide for direct action against
the insurers of various classes of carriers for hire; South Carolina also
provides that indemnitors may be joined. The statutes of three other
states, Alabama, 20 Kansas 2 l and New Mexico, 2 do not expressly
provide for the direct action but they have been so interpreted. The
courts of two states, Californian and North Dakota, 2 have interpreted
city ordinances requiring taxi companies to carry liability insurance as
permitting direct action against such insurers and, in North Dakota,
this decision was reached despite a state statute to the contrary.25
C.

Direct A ction Under Subrogation-Type Statutes

The subrogation-type statutes of several states permit direct action
against the insurer after the return of a judgment against the insured.
Under statutes of this type, sometimes called semi-direct action laws,
the judgment creditor becomes subrogated to the insured's right to have
the insurer satisfy the judgment to the limits of its policy. Following
this scheme, the statutes of Arkansas, 27 California,28 Massachusetts,
New York, 30 Ohio 3' and Rhode Island 2 specifically provide for the
See, e.g., 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4862.
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 68-509,-612 (1967).
17. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 169 (Supp. 1969-70).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-702 (1962).
19. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 842, 882 (1967).
20. See note 14 supraand accompanying text.
21. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-1, 128 (1964), construed in Sterling v. Hartenstein, 185 Kan.
50, 341 P.2d 90 (1959).
22. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-27-49 (Supp. 1969), construed in Deeg v. Lumbermen's Mut.
Cas. Co., 279 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1960), and Breeden v. Wilson, 58 N.M. 517, 273 P.2d 376
(1954).
23. Butler v. Sequeira, 100 Cal. App. 2d 143, 223 P.2d 48 (1950); see Rupley v. Huntsman,
159 Cal. App. 2d 307, 324 P.2d 19 (1958).
24. James v. Young, 77 N.D. 451,43 N.W.2d 692 (1950).
25. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-16-11 (1960), 49-18-33 (Supp. 1969).
26. Degnan, Semi-Direct Action Against Liability Insurers: Current Problems, 13 VAND.
15.
16.

L.

REV.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

871 (1960).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4001 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580 (West 1955).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, §§ 112-13 (1959).

N.Y. INS. LAW § 167 (McKinney 1966).
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3929.06 (Baldwin 1964).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-7-2 (1968).
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action, but in Arkansas and New York suit may not be brought until
30 days after the judgment creditor has served upon the insurer or the
insured notice of entry of the judgment. Ohio requires the same waiting
period though without the necessity of giving notice of the judgment's
entry. The statutes of three states, North Dakota,3 Tennessee 4 and
West Virginia, 5 contain clear subrogation language to the effect that
upon damage to anyone by an insured, the liability of the insurer
becomes absolute and that satisfaction by the insured of a judgment
rendered against him is not a condition precedent to the insurer's duty
to pay. While no direct action is expressly authorized, the statutory
wording would seem to leave little doubt as to its permissibility. Five
states, Illinois, 3 Iowa, 37 Maryland, 38 Michigan39 and Virginia, 0 impose
the additional requirement that before the direct suit may be brought
there must have been an execution against the insured returned
unsatisfied, and in Iowa the action must be brought within 180 days
from the entry of the judgment.
The subrogation statutes cited in this section are generally utilized
only in those situations in which the insurer refuses to pay the judgment
rendered against its insured. Since this may require the plaintiff to
resist the defenses of the insurer based upon its insurance contract, the
subrogation action, with its two-lawsuit aspect, presents a remedy less
attractive than direct action in the original suit brought to determine
liability and damages. Moreover, inasmuch as some authorities are of
the opinion that the judgment creditor has a right of subrogation in
any event, 41 it is open to question whether the statutes discussed in this
section grant any rights not already possessed by judgment creditors
42
against intransigent insurers
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-16.1-11(6) (Supp. 1969).
34. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1223 (Repl. Vol. 1968).
35. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17D-4-12(f) (1966).
36. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1000 (Smith-Hurd 1965).
37. IOWA CODE § 516.1 (1966).
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 481 (Repl. Vol. 1968).
39. Mici. STAT. ANN. § 24.13006 (Rev. Vol. 1957).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-380 (Repl. Vol. 1953).
41. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); 8 J.
APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4831.
42. See Peerless Ins. Co. v. Sheehan, 194 So. 2d 285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Grain
Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Quarrier, 175 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Conley v. Singleton,
171 So. 2d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against His
Liability Insurer, 13 VAND. L. REv. 837, (1960).
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D.

DirectA ctions in Special Situations

Three states permit direct actions against insurers when special
circumstances are present. In Arkansas, a liability insurer may be sued
directly whenever its insured is clothed with sovereign or charitable
immunity.4 3 Rhode Island allows the direct suit whenever process
cannot be served upon the insured in the state.44 By a rule of court,
Texas provides that joinder of a liability or indemnity insurer is
permissible when such insurer is by statute or the terms of its policy
liable to the injured party. 45 While each of these situations is potentially
significant, the present dearth of reported cases seems to indicate a
rather limited use of the available'procedures to date.
III.
A.

THE

Shingleton DECISIONS ANALYZED

The Opinion of the District Court of Appeal

Procedurally, the instant case reached the appellate courts on
appeal from the trial judge's order dismissing Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company as a party defendant. In the District Court of
Appeal," plaintiff contended that Nationwide was properly joined as a
real party in interest within the meaning of rule 1.210(a) of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure 7 and that the policy of insurance issued by
Nationwide was such as to make plaintiff, as a member of the general
public, a third-party beneficiary thereto with a right to sue the insurer
for damages covered by the policy. Nationwide pleaded in defense that
(1) it was not a real party in interest within the meaning of the rules
of procedure; (2) no privity of contract existed between it and plaintiff
on the policy of insurance issued to its insured; (3) the direct
interjection of insurance matters into personal injury cases before juries
is prejudicial to insurers; and (4) plaintiff may not sue together one
defendant on a cause of action sounding in tort and another defendant
on a claim sounding in contract.
Faced with this array of contentions, the court turned first to a
consideration of rule 1.210(a), which provides that ".

.

. any person

may be made a defendant who has or claims an interest adverse to the
plaintiff."4 Then, to determine the nature of the insurer's interest the
43.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3240 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-7-2 (1968).
TEx. R. Civ. P. 97(0.
Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So. 2d 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
See note 48 infra and accompanying text.
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.210(a), quoted in full at 211 So. 2d 595.
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court took notice of the terms of the typical automobile liability
insurance policy: (1) the insurer reserves the right to handle and control
litigation against its insured; (2) the insurer retains the right to settle
out of court without the consent of -the insured; (3) in case of suit the
insurer is obligated to defend its insured, provide counsel, and pay the
resulting costs; and (4) the insurer is liable, within policy limits, for the
damages assessed against its insured. 9 In view of these policy
provisions the court asked:
. . .[H]ow can we honestly say that the insurance company does not have such
interest adverse to that of the plaintiff that the insurance company can be brought

out into the open as a real party in interest?w
In answer to this question the court said:

Therefore, if the insurance company by the very nature of its contract of insurance

has injected itself into the litigation as a real party in interest, then it should not
be heard to deny the right of the plaintiff to point this out in a complaint for
damages against an insured... P .

The quoted statement of the court seems to indicate that the
insurance policy terms cited estop the insurer from asserting that it is
not a real party in interest. To reinforce this view, the court looked to
other evidence of an estoppel nature and found support in a petition
filed in 1966 by the Florida Bar Association seeking additional rules
governing the conduct of so-called "house counsel," particularly
attorneys regularly retained by insurers to defend their insureds 2 It
was argued before the Supreme Court of Florida that such retainers
constitute unethical practice of law unless the insurers possess an
interest in the litigation. To counter the arguments thus made,
attorneys for the insurance industry candidly admitted that insurers are
real parties in interest in lawsuits defended for their insureds. These
admissions posed an obvious dilemma for Nationwide in the instant
case, and the court, in holding that a defending insurance company is
unquestionably a real party in interest, refused to permit Nationwide
to take an inconsistent position 3
As another basis for its decision the court held that automobile
liability insurance policies are quasi-third-party beneficiary contracts
49.
50.
51.
52.

See Tarpey, supra note 1.
211 So. 2d at 596.

53.

For differing views on whether the insurer is a real party in interest, compare Wis. STAT

Id.
In re Rules Governing Conduct of Attorneys in Fla., 220 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1969).

§ 260.11 (Supp. 1969), and New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Harrington, 274 F.2d 323 (5th
Cir. 1960) (involving LA. REv. STAT. § 22:655 (Supp. 1970)), with Stark v. Crowell, 117 Vt. 413,
94 A.2d 585 (1953) (involving VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 842 & 882 (1967)).
ANN.
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giving the injured third-party beneficiary a contract right to join the
insurer as a party defendant. 4 Noting the existence of a state financial
responsibility act,55 the recognized public need for complete liability
insurance coverage, and the injection of the insurance company as an
interested party, the court concluded that members of the general
public are third party beneficiaries of the insurance contracts. No
attempt was undertaken to explain how, if at all, the third-party
beneficiary theory is related to the real party in interest rationale.
Taking notice of the widespread public knowledge of existing state
financial responsibility laws, the court rejected Nationwide's allegation
that prejudice would occur if insurance matters were communicated to
the jury, 6 and observed that numerous means are commonly utilized
to communicate to the jury indirectly the presence of insurance in the
case. 57 The court likewise dispensed with the contention that claims in
tort and contract may not be joined in a single suit since, in the court's
view, this prohibition had been swept away by the liberal joinder
provisions of rule 1.210(a) and its policy against multiple suits. On
these bases the court discarded all of the insurer's defenses and reversed
the trial judge's dismissal of Nationwide as a party defendant to the
cause.
B. The Opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida
Following the adverse decision by the District Court of Appeal,
the Supreme Court of Florida granted Nationwide's petition for
certiorari. The subsequent decision, 58 however, further weakened
Nationwide's position by affirming the appellate court's decision on
even broader grounds. Whereas the District Court of Appeal began its
analysis with rule 1.210(a) before proceeding to other considerations,
the supreme court commenced its reasoning with public policy
considerations and then proceeded down to the rule. Considering the
broad basis of the resulting decision, this change in emphasis may
indicate that the supreme court would have reached the same result
even without the support of the rule's language.
Opening its opinion, the court referred to the now classic opinion
54.

LA.

REV. STAT.

§ 22:655 (Supp. 1970) provides that injured persons are third party

beneficiaries.
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 324 (1968).

56. See notes 79-85 infra and accompanying text.
57.

E.g., voir dire, cross examination. 21 J.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

58.

§ 282(a), at 135 (3d ed. 1940).

223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).

APPLEMAN,

supra note 3, § 12831; 2 J.
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of Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. 9 and, borrowing from the great public policy basis of that
decision, stated:
We conclude a direct cause of action now inures to a third party beneficiary
against an insurer in motor vehicle liability insurance coverage cases as a product
of theprevailingpublicpolicy of Florida. 0

Throughout its opinion the court articulated a number of public policy
grounds for its conclusion, but, of the many public policy aspects
considered by the court, perhaps the most influential was the strong
public interest in automobile liability insurance. Since such insurance
is carefully regulated by law and is absolutely essential for the
protection of the general public, the court determined that it is
therefore unreasonable to limit or restrict lawsuits which so
importantly affect the interests of the public generally. Additionally,
the court took notice of the growing need to eliminate multiple suits
arising out of a single incident and the desirability of disposing of all
the parties' claims at once." In view of these desired ends, the court
found it contradictory, anomalous, and discriminatory for the parties
to liability insurance contracts to attempt to deny non-consenting
members of the public a complete and expeditious remedy by inserting
non-joinder provisions in such contracts." Moreover, in this era of
more mature juries, the court felt compelled to conclude that full
disclosure at trial of insurance matters is preferable to the questionable
"ostrich head in the sand"63 approach with its misleading innuendoes
of insurance lurking guiltily in the background. Pulling together all
these factors, the court decided that it is unrealistic and improper that
mass liability insurance coverage designed to afford protective benefits
for the general public should bar identified members of the protected
class from the pursuance of a speedy, realistic and adequate action for
recovery.
As a means of implementing these public policy objectives, the
court further expanded the third-party beneficiary theory adopted by
the District Court of Appeal. Beginning this analysis the court quoted
with approval from a recent Illinois case: "[A]utomobile insurance has
taken an important position in the modern world. It is no longer a
59.
60.
61.
62.

217N.Y. 382, III N.E. 1050(1916).
223 So. 2d at 715 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 145, 147 n.31 (1969):
The court also stated that such non-joinder provisions are incompatible with the state
constitution. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (Revision 1968).
63. 223 So. 2d at 718.
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private contract merely between two parties."'" In this regard, the court

cited a number of factors lifting such contracts out of the category of
purely private contracts: (1) the peculiar significance of automobile
liability insurance policies because of their essential protective
coverage; (2) the presumption that persons obtaining insurance
coverage contemplate possible injuries to others and therefore intend
direct benefits to them; (3) the great and growing number of
automobile accidents and consequent personal injury litigation; and (4)
the proliferation of governmental regulation of automobile liability
insurance through control of premium rates and the establishment of
required policy provisions such as mandatory uninsured motorist
coverage. Considering all these circumstances, the court concluded that
the many interests involved transcend the limits of a personal contract
between insurer and insured:
Viewed in this light, we think there exists sufficient reason to raise by operation

of law the intent to benefit injured third parties and thus to render motor vehicle
liability insurance amenable to the third party beneficiary doctrine.0

Having reached this decision, the court found that its position was
further buttressed by the liberal joinder provisions of rule 1.210(a).
Determining that automobile liability insurers are indeed real parties
in interest,"1 the court reasoned that they possess no special privilege
to contract immunity from suit by third parties. Furthermore, the court
ruled:
. . [o]ne
[
of the fundamental goals of modern procedural jurisprudence is to

secure a method of providing an efficient and expeditious adjudication of the rights
of persons possessing adverse interests in a controversy 7

The court concluded that this fundamental goal may best be achieved
by joining insurer and insured as defendants in the plaintiff's original
negligence action notwithstanding prior case law prohibiting joinder of
claims in tort with claims in Contract."s Emphasized by the court were
a number of situations in which potential insurance coverage questions
between insurer and insured could operate to defeat a plaintiff's chance
.64. Gothberg v. Nemerovski, 58 Ill. App. 2d 372, 386, 208 N.E.2d 12, 20 (1965), quoting
Simmon v. Iowa Mut. Cas. Co. 3 Ill. 2d 318, 322, 121 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1954). This interesting
case involved a suit against an insurance broker whose failure to procure liability insurance for
another pursuant to their contract caused the broker to be subjected to direct action by parties
injured in a collision with the prospective insured.
65. 223 So. 2d at 716 (emphasis added). See note 54 supra.
66. See note 53 supra.
67. 223 So. 2d at 718.
68. See cases cited note 2 supra.
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of recovery." Joinder of all parties and claims, the court stated, would
materially reduce the dangers inherent in the insurer's assertion of
policy defenses against the claims of injured third parties. It carefully
noted, however, that particular complicating issues likely to unduly
hamper the trial of an action may be severed for separate trial if
necessary.
Two dissenting members of the court stated their belief that,
contrary to the majority's view, the injection of insurance aspects into
personal injury actions will impede rather than expedite the
adjudication of claims because of the additional issues to be decided.
As a second ground of dissent, the judges made the now familiar
observation that the change decreed by the court was one better left for
determination by the legislature.70 Finally, it was argued that although
rule 1.210(a) permits joinder of all persons having adverse interests, it
is limited to those interests that are independently actionable; since, in
their view, the injured party has no actionable claim against the
insurer until the insured's liability has been established, the rule does
not authorize the insurer's joinder in the original action.
In affirming the decision of the District Court of Appeal, the
Supreme Court of Florida firmly established the first wholly judgemade direct action against automobile liability insurers in a broadbased public policy opinion touching significantly upon the subject
areas of civil procedure, insurance, and torts.
IV.

Shingleton HOLDINGS
A. Policies in Conflict
In precise terms, the Florida Supreme Court's decision in the
instant case is limited to direct actions against automobile liability
insurers in Florida by iersons injured in motoring accidents. However;
because of the broad policy bases of the decision, it is certainly
amenable to significant future extension. Almost certain to be tested
by direct action are general liability policies and indemnity policies.
Among those likely to be involved are homeowners' liability insurance,
commercial property insurance, insurance carried by governmental and
charitable bodies, products liability insurance and professional
69.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE

E.g., Bergh v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 216 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1968) (insured's delay

in giving insurer notice of accident); Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 185 So. 2d
689 (Fla. 1966) (insured's procurement of multiple coverage).
70. On several occasions direct action legislation has failed passage in the Florida
Legislature. 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 145, 146 n.12 (1969).
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malpractice insurance!' Of equal or greater importance is the prospect
of Shingleton's adoption by those states which currently recognize only
limited direct actions or no direct actions at all."2 Significant 'also are
the conflict of laws possibilities presented when states other than
Florida have interests in and contacts with a particular case. One court,
for example, has already held that the instant case grants to injured
persons a substantive right permitting suit against a general indemnity
insurer in New York for injuries sustained in a Florida accident.7 3
Moreover, it appears from the information available that this court
applied Shingleton to a case not involving an automobile accident.
Just how the courts will extend or limit the future application of
Shingleton cannot be predicted since direct actions have consistently
engendered conflicts at the public policy level. It is to be expected,
therefore, that most of the decisions to come will hinge upon resolution
of these policy conflicts. While this difficulty may make future cases
unpredictable, it may also make their holdings more considered and
meaningful. In the instant case, for example, the court decided that the
public interest in expeditious litigation of automobile accident cases
among all persons genuinely interested in a specific incident outweighs
the insurer's interest in lessening the prejudice alleged to result from
revealing the fact of insurance coverage to juries. Moreover, the court
was of the opinion that full disclosure of insurance matters might tend
to reduce the danger of jury speculation as to the existence and extent
of insurance in any particular case. Of similar import is the possibility
that such full disclosure could eliminate the opportunities presently
71. The Florida District Court of Appeal which first decided Shingleton in 1968 has
recently held that direct actions may be applied ". . with equal force to all types of liability
insurance policies which protect and benefit injured third parties, and are not restricted exclusively
to a consideration of automobile liability insurance contracts." Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory,
230 So. 2d 495, 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App: 1970). This case involved an accident in which it was
alleged that there had been negligent maintenance of the premises insured by defendant General

Accident Fire and Life Insurance Company, Ltd., and owned by the Beta Eta House Corp. But,
while holding that-the direct action applied to this case, the court then set out a procedure for

separating the various claims so that the liability aspects would be tried with a complete exclusion
of the insurance aspects of the case; insurance coverage, the court held, should be tried separately

after the liability issues. The court stated that this procedure was necessary since the prejudice
theory has not yet been conclusively disproven. Thus in one decision the court both significantly
extended and limited Shingleton. The results seem quite incongruous and the case has been

certified to the Supreme Court of Florida for its consideration. In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Roberts, 231 So. 2d 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), another Florida appellate court extended

Shingleton to a case involving a homeowner's insurance policy and, although the court cited with
approval the Gregory case, supra, it did not apply the limitation discussed therein.
72. Barrios v. Dade County, 38 U.S.L.W. 1111, 2393 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1970), is the first
case to apply Shingleton in a forum outside of Florida. See text accompanying note 118 infra.

73. Id.
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available for attorneys to communicate the fact of insurance to the jury
in a manner calculated to damage the opponent's case. Indeed, jury
awareness of soaring insurance premium rates could conceivably lead
to an inverse prejudice against plaintiffs when insurance matters are
brought to the forefront.
In addition to swift trial among all interested parties, other policy
goals support the allowance of direct action. Of these, perhaps the most
important is the presence in the case of a financially responsible
defendant. Also, despite the presence of non-resident motorist
statutes, 74 it is still considerably easier for the insured to escape service
of process than it is for insurance companies that normally conduct
multistate operations; and even when service is obtained on an absent
insured there may be no assets within the jurisdiction to subject to any
judgment rendered. Considerations of this sort led to the enactment of
the direct action statutes of Puerto Rico and Guam where transient
75
insureds often left injured persons without a practical remedy.
Certainly this interest is noticeably increasing as Americans continue
to become an ever more migratory society.
A related policy goal served through direct action is the prevention
of losses suffered from being shifted to the families of the injured or
the general public of the state of injury or residence. Similarly, those
receiving accidental injuries when traveling through a sister state
frequently require care at the expense of that state's public funds.
Response to this need resulted in the enactment of the direct action
76
statutes of Louisiana and Wisconsin.
A final policy issue, and one which concerned the court in
Shingleton, is that of preventing loss of the injured party's chance of
recovery through the insurer's assertion of defenses arising from the
insured's misconduct in failing to comply with the terms of his
insurance policy after the happening of the liability-creating accident.
Citing illustrative cases,77 the court stated that this undesirable result
could be reduced or avoided by requiring the insurer to present and
substantiate any such defenses in the original action against its insured.
The judicial direct action of Shingleton greatly facilitates the
achievement of this policy goal.
74. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.171 (1969). See generally Gibbons, A Survey of the
Modern Nonresident Motorist Statutes, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 257 (1960).
75. See Capital Ins. & Sur. Co. v. Kelly, 361 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1025 (1967).
76. See 22 LA. L. REV. 243, 244 nn. I & 2 (1961).
77. See cases cited note 69 supra.
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It is submitted in conclusion that these policies should be
considered fully by the courts when called upon to extend or adopt
Shingleton; it is further submitted that the growing public interest in
the various forms of liability and indemnity insurance may be such as
to outweigh all other competing interests in view of the rapidly
expanding acquisition of such insurance to cover a widening range of
potential risks. In the instant case the court forthrightly met the issues
presented and ably set forth a procedure by which it felt the conflicting
interests might best be served. Authorization of the direct action may
result, however, in more recoveries by more plaintiffs and consequent
higher insurance rates;" these results are really a by-product of the
basic fact that through direct action insurers will be called upon more
often to perform according to the terms of their insurance contracts.
Despite the possibility of higher premium rates, such a situation is
difficult to label undesirable. Nevertheless, many potential problem
areas confront Shingleton's future application. In the following section,
a number of these areas will be examined and some solutions suggested,
particularly in light of the experience of other jurisdictions that have
dealt with direct actions.
B.

Problem Areas of FutureApplication

1. Prejudice and Jury Verdicts.-Although examined to some
extent above, the prejudice theory deserves additional attention in view
of its continued vitality and staunch assertion by insurance counsel. In
American jurisprudence the general rule continues to be that insurance
matters must be hidden from the jury because of their alleged
prejudicial effect.79 However, eminent authorities have subjected the
rule to much criticism. 0 One commentator even states that injection of
insurance into jury trials tends to diminish the size of verdicts,8 while
another writer suggests that Wisconsin's direct action statute has been
responsible for that state's comparatively higher insurance rates. 2 This
conflict would seem to illustrate dramatically the division of opinion.
Perhaps the most realistic view is that proffered by the New York
78. See Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MicH. L.
REV. 689, 695 (1959-60).
79. See Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 Ill. 438, 74 N.E.2d 601 (1947); 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note
3, § 4861; Peck supra note 78, at 695 n.19; Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761 (1949).
80. 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4862, at 303; 2 J. WaoiGR,
supra note 57.
81. 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4861 n.18; see 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 145, 149 nn.45-48
(1969) and accompanying text. Contra, Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project,38 NEDl.
L. REV. 744 (1959).
82. Peck, supra note 78.
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Court of Appeals: ". . . [I]t is the rare individual who today does not
know that 'defendants in negligence cases are insured and that an
insurance company and its lawyer are defending.'
Part of the basis
of this court's conclusion was the well-known fact that insurance
84
matters are regularly communicated to juries by able counsel.
Another court's suggested middle-group approach is to hold that jury
knowledge of insurance is not prejudicial unless the defendant has
thereby been deprived of a fair trial on the issues."'
With the authorities thus divided, several alternatives are open to
a court facing the question of whether to permit direct action in a
certain case or class of cases. It is submitted that several considerations
should govern: first, the court ought to recognize both the pervasiveness
of insurance coverage and the greater sophistication of today's juries
and then decide whether the risk of blind speculation by the jury
outweighs the risk of prejudice from forthright disclosure; second, the
court should determine whether the case before it is one of a class
affected with a strong public interest like that subsisting in automobile
liability insurance; and third, the court should decide whether the
likelihood of the insurer's being prejudiced on the trial of the issues
outweighs the policies served by permitting the direct action. If the
Shingleton rationale is sound, there will be few cases justifying
exclusion of the insurer.
2. Parties.-A frequent question posed by direct action statutes
is whether the insurer may be sued alone or whether both insurer and
insured must be joined. Guam, Louisiana, Puerto Rico, and Wisconsin
have answered that the insurer may be sued alone, 86 while Oklahoma
has said that suit against the insurer must be dismissed unless the
insured is also a party. The court in Shingleton was not faced with
the question, but for the future the alternatives are obvious. It has been
suggested that rather than adopt the permissive joinder allowed by
Louisiana and Wisconsin or the mandatory joinder required by
Oklahoma, the insured should be considered a necessary but not
indispensable party 8 The virtue of this approach is that suit would
",83

83.

Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 118, 204 N.E.2d 622, 626, 256 N.Y.S.2d

577, 583 (1965).
84. See note 57 supra.
85. Oklahoma Transp. Co. v. Claiborn, 434 P.2d 299 (Okla. 1967).
86. GUAM GOV'T CODE §§ 23525, 43354 (1961); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, §§ 2001 (1958),
2003 (Supp. 1968); Dowden v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 158 So. 2d 399 (La. Ct.
App. 1963); Elliott v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 201 Wis. 445,230 N.W. 87 (1930).
87. Robertson v. Nye, 275 F. Supp. 497 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
88. 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 145, 146-48 (1969). See generally James, Necessary and
IndispensableParties, 18 U. MIAI L. REv. 68 (1963).
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still be possible in the absence of the insured, thus assuring the injured
party an opportunity for recovery. However, as the next subsection
illustrates, permissive rather than mandatory or necessary joinder gives
plaintiffs distinct advantages in avoiding certain defenses of the
insured.
3. Defenses and Immunitites.-The supreme court in Shingleton
asserted as one reason for permitting joinder that such procedure may
prevent the insured's failure to notify or cooperate with the insurer
from presenting a bar to the plaintiff's recovery. 9 This was at least a
preliminary indication that the defenses of the insurer against its
insured may be assertable against the injured third party. These
defenses are based upon the insured's failure to comply with the terms
of the insurance policy after the accident giving rise to the suit; of
course the insured will not thereby be relieved from liability, but the
injured party may well lose the only financially able source of payment
through misconduct over which he had no control. To prevent this
possibility Louisiana cuts off the insurer's policy defenses at the time
of the occurrence of the accident, holding that to rule otherwise would
be inconsistent with the Louisiana statute's intent to fix the liability of
insurers and to benefit injured persons." Wisconsin apparently takes
the position that the insurer does not automatically lose its policy
defenses upon the occurrence of an accident; however, the defenses are
definitely assertable if the insured's failures resulted in prejudice to the
insurer's cause. In such cases the injured party has the burden of
showing lack of prejudice to the insurer.9' Puerto Rico similarly
requires prejudice to the insurer before the defenses may be urged, but
it appears that the burden of proof is on the insurer rather than the
party seeking recovery.12 The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico,
moreover, has ruled that the injured party may be completely
protected from such defenses by notifying the insurer of the
accident and serving upon it a copy of his complaint. 3 Considering
these several views, it is submitted that the most reasonable position is
to hold that while the accident does not immediately cut off the
89. See cases cited note 69 supra.
90. King v. King, 253 La. 270, 217 So. 2d 395 (1968); Futch v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y.,
246 La. 688, 166 So. 2d 274 (1964) (undertaking to reconcile seemingly conflicting provisions of
the Louisiana direct action statute relating to defenses).
91. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 204.34(3) (1957); Calhoun v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 260 Wis.
34,49 N.W.2d 911 (1951).
92. Cuebas v. Porto Rican &Am. Ins. Co., 85 P.R.R. 601 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
93. Cuebas v. Porto Rican & Am. Ins. Co., 85 P.R.R. 601 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Colon v.
Government of the Capital of Puerto Rico, 62 P.R.R. 24 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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insurer's policy defenses, the insurer must plead and prove prejudice to

its cause and that the injured party can obtain complete protection by
reasonable notice to the insurer followed by service of a copy of the

complaint.
Another important category of defenses is that denominated as
"personal." Among these are coverture, family immunity, charitable

immunity,9 and sovereign immunity.15 Louisiana has held that these
immunities cannot be pleaded in defense by the insurer when sued alone

because they in no way grow out of the insurance contract or the
accident." Under this reasoning, a complete defense available to the

insured is wholly unavailable to the insurer if both are not joined. Of
course this problem will be lessened where recognized immunities are
fewer97 although obvious tactical advantages are presented if'plaintiffs

are permitted to sue the insurer without joining the insured. While these
conflicts are difficult to resolve, a partial answer discussed in the

preceding subsection is to hold that the insured is a necessary but not
indispensable party thus making all defenses available where he can be
joined. When the insured cannot be joined, perhaps it would be
appropriate to allow the insurer to assert any defenses which would
have been available to the insured. However, this practice might

produce inequitable results in situations involving charitable or
sovereign immunity since coverage expressly designed to protect injured
third parties could not be applied to their claims. Another alternative,
therefore, is to permit the insurer to assert all personal defenses except
charitable and sovereign immunity. Either approach would prevent

serious disadvantage to the defendant insurer in a direct action.
A third problem area is presented by statutes of limitation.

Primarily at issue is the question of which statute applies to an injured
94. For a general cataloguing of the current status of charitable immunities, see Rabon v.
Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 17-19, 152 S.E.2d 485,496-98 (1967).
95. Sovereign immunity is quickly withering away. E.g., Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 145, 151 n.69 (1969). See generally
Gibbons, Liability Insurance and the Tort Immunity of State and Local Government, 8 DuKE
L.. 588 (1959).
96. LeBlanc v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 202 La. 857, 13 So. 2d 245 (1943); Edwards v.
Royal Indem. Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935); Soirez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 168 So. 2d
418 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Dowden v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 158 So. 2d 399 (La.
Ct. App. 1963); Musmeci v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 496 (La. Ct. App. 1962); see
22 LA. L. REv. 243, 246-49 (1961). Contra, Fehr v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 246
Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944).
97. For example, Florida retains interspousal and family immunity while not allowing
charitable or sovereign immunity as a defense. 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 145, 151 & nn. 68-71 (1969).
See also Gaston v. Pittman, 285 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Fia. 1968); Thomas v. Herron, 20 Ohio St.
2d 62, 253 N.E.2d 772 (1969).

648

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 23

party's direct action against the insurer. A convenient method of
deciding would be simply to characterize the action as sounding either
in tort or in contract. Louisiana, for instance, holds that its statute
creates a cause of action in tort to which the tort statute of limitations
is applicable.98 Puerto Rico, while also applying its tort statute of
limitations, concedes that the action probably sounds in contract."
However, since Shingleton was decided in part on the third party
beneficiary doctrine, it would appear that the Florida courts may be
inclined to rule that the action against the insurer is one in contract.
In Florida, for example, the plaintiff would have an additional year to
commence a direct action because of the longer statute of limitations
as to contracts.'0 Although additional complications may be presented
when wrongful death statutes of limitation are involved,'' perhaps the
best solution is that suggested by Puerto Rico: acknowledge that the
cause of action is in contract but apply the tort or wrongful death
statutes of limitation since the damage arises from the commission of
a tort.9 2 This approach would place insurer and insured on equal
footing by barring the direct action whenever the statute has run as to
the insured. Nevertheless, a corollary problem not solved by the above
suggested procedure is whether suit against either the insurer or the
insured tolls the running of the applicable statute of limitations as to
the party not joined. Louisiana holds that its statute of limitations is
tolled by suit against either party. 0 3 To hold otherwise could result in
a plaintiff's being unable to join the insurer as a defendant .after
bringing suit against the insured within the statute of limitations, which
would disserve the many policies promoted by allowing direct action.
A final area of difficulty concerns theassertion by the insurer of
defenses inconsistent with the interests of its insured such as fraud in
the procurement of the insurance policy and intentional misconduct in
causing the accident. Earlier Florida decisions, for example, seem to
indicate that to permit such defenses would be inconsistent with the
good faith required of insurers in the defense of claims against their
insureds."" It is submitted, however, that in a direct action the insurer
98.
99.

Soirez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 168 So. 2d 418 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
Fraticelli v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 186 (ist Cir. 1967).
I00. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3) (1960) (5-year period on contracts); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 95.11(4) (1960) (4-year period on torts).
101. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(6) (1960) (2-year period on wrongful death); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.04 (1964) (2-year period on wrongful death of minor child).
102. Fraticelli v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1967).
103. Finn v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 141 So. 2d 852 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
104. E.g. Springer v. Citizens Cas. Co., 246 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1957); Automobile Mut.
Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla._815, 184 So. 852 (1938).
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has another interst to serve, namely that of preventing the return of a

judgment against itself as well as against its insured. Permitting
inconsistent defenses would serve the policy of eliminating multiple

suits by having all claims presented at once, but it might unduly confuse
and complicate particular lawsuits. Nevertheless, it is submitted that
in view of the new interests involved, sudh inconsistent defenses should

ordinarily be permissible and that the court should, on proper motion,
sever for separate trial issues which would excessively hinder or prolong

the action brought to determine liability and damages.
4.

Conflict of Laws.-Many potential problems are posed when

a direct action suit involves more than one jurisdiction. Some courts
have been reluctant to enforce rights created under another state's
direct action statute; 05 Louisiana will not even enforce its own statute

where the accident occurred outside the state.'

Mississippi, Missouri,

and Texas have refused to allow direct actions based upon the
Louisiana statute on the ground that it is merely procedural, 7 and
even the Louisiana courts have expressed differing opinions as to the

nature of the rights created.

8

Contrariwise, federal courts sitting in

Georgia and New York have permitted suit based upon Louisiana's
statute and have held that it grants substantive rights to injured

parties. 09 Wisconsin's direct action statute has received similar

treatment, and in one interesting disagreement, federal district courts
in Illinois have held that the statute creates substantive rights upon
which suit may be entertained in such courts" while the Illinois state
courts have refused to allow the direct action."' Although theses state
2
courts have held the statute to be both substantive and procedural,"
105. See cases cited notes 107 & I ll infra.
106. Weingartner v. Fidelity Mut. Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1953) (Illinois accident);
Hidalgo v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 104 F. Supp. 230 (W.D. La. 1952), affd, 205 F.2d 834 (5th Cir.
1953) (Alamba accident); Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 24 So. 2d
875 (1946) (Mississippi accident).
107. Cook v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 241 Miss. 371, 128 So. 2d 363 (1961); Noe v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 406 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1966); Penny v. Powell, 162 Tex. 497,
347 S.W.2d 601 (1961); accord, Pearson v. Globe Indem. Co., 311 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1962).
108. Compare West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950) (substantive)
with Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 24 So. 2d 875 (1946) (procedural).
109. Collins v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956); Shapiro v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 234 F. Supp. 41 (N.D. Ga. 1963), affd, 337 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1964).
110. Swanson v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 275 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Posner v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 244 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
111. Marchlik v. Coronet Ins. Co., 40 Ill. 2d 327, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968); Mutual Serv.
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 25 II!. App. 2d 429, 166 N.E.2d 316 (1960).
112. Marchlik v. Coronet Ins. Co. 40 Ill. 2d 327, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968) (substantive);
Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 25 II1. App. 2d 429, 166 N.E.2d 316
(1960) (procedural).
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the ground for refusing its application has consistently been that direct
actions offend the public policy of Illinois." 3 Michigan, while holding
that the right created by the Wisconsin statute is subtantive, has
declined to enforce it for public policy reasons."' In Minnesota the
situation is unclear because of a split of authority in the decisions of
the state supreme court."5 An important factor considered by some of
the courts is that by their own terms the Louisiana and Wisconsin
statutes limit direct actions to the courts of their respective states. 116
Even so, those courts desiring to permit direct actions have
characterized the limiting statutory provisions as relating to venue only
and not as intending to bar actions based upon the statutes in those
courts choosing to consider the rights granted as substantive)"
Whether Shingleton will form the basis for actions in courts
outside of Florida has already received a partial answer. In Barrios v.
Dade County,"' the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that Shingleton grants a substantive cause
of action against an insurer which may be sued upon in that court. In
so holding, the district court expanded the Florida decision to cover a
general indemnity insurer. Equally significant is the fact that although
the injuries were sustained in Florida, they apparently were not caused
by an atitomobile collision. Thus in a single case the Barrioscourt both
adopted and expanded the basic rationale of Shingleton.
On balance it would seem that Shingleton might receive easier
acceptance in foreign courts than the direct action stautes since, unlike
the statutes, it contains no built-in venue restrictions and is supportable
on several alternative bases. Nevertheless, to hostile courts it should be
equally susceptible to avoidance as either procedural or violative of
public policy. As this subsection indicates, a number of courts have
permitted the direct action because of their feeling that direct action
rights are substantive."' This would seem to indicate that enforcement
Cases cited note 112 supra.
Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d 547 (1946) construing
STAT. ANN. § 24.13030 (Rev. Vol. 1957).

113.
114.
MICH.

115. Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Minn. 478, 24 N.W.2d 836 (1946)
(not permitting the action); Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N.W. 329 (1932) (permitting

the action).
116. LA. REV. STAT. § 22:655 (Supp. 1970); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 260.11 (Supp. 1969).
117. See Collins v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956); Posner v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 244 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. I11. 1965), relying upon Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R.
Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914); Swanson v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 275 F. Supp. 544 (N.D.
Iil. (1967). See also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
118. 38 U.S.L.W. 1111, 2393 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1970).
119. See cases cited notes 109-10 supra.
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was allowed either on the lex locus delicti theory or in furtherance of
the vested rights policy. Either approach would provide an adequate

basis for the application of Shingleton. To date only the New York
Court of Appeals has allowed suit based upon another jurisdiction's

2°
direct action statute on the basis of the significant contacts theory.

Perhaps that theory presents the most equitable, if not the most

workable, formula for solving the conflicts problems sure to arise.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has taken this approach with its
statute, 2 ' and it is submitted herein that a careful weighing of the
competing interests by courts faced with applying Shingleton in the

conflicts- context will provide a basis for achieving just results while
22
avoiding either due process or full faith and credit violations.
5.

Third Party Practice.- Because the number of persons who

may be joined in an action under liberal rules of procedure is virtually
unlimited, special problems are posed for direct action suits.123 Where,

for instance, plaintiff does not join the defendant's insurer, it may be
appropriate for the defendant himself to implead his insurer,
particularly in a case where the insurer refuses to defend its insured. 24

Three states have held this procedure to be proper despite insurance
policy provisions to the contrary.'

Of course the insurer may likewise

seek to implead its insured in order to gain the benefit of his personal
defenses. Where counter or cross claims are involved, it may be

appropriate for a defendant to join the plaintiff's insurer or the insurer
of another defendant.

2

The Wisconsin direct action statute grants

specific authority for such joinder of additional claims and parties. 127
120. Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965).
This case involved Puerto Rico's direct action statute which was thereafter amended to include a
venue provision like those of Louisiana and Wisconsin. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 26, § 2003 (Supp.
1968), amending P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 26, § 2003 (1958).
121. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
122. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397
(1931); Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operationaland Cdnflict-of-Law Problems,74 HARV.
L. REv. 357 (1960).
123. See 22 LA. L. REv. 243, 254-55 (1961).
124. Jenkins v. General Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 349 Mass. 699, 212 N.E.2d 464
(1965); Adelman Mfg. Corp. v. New York Wood Finisher's Supply Co., 277 App. Div. 1117,
100 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1950); accord as to diversity suit, Jordan v. Stephens, 7 F.R.D. 140 (W.D.
Mo. 1945).
125. Cases cited note 124 supra.
126. See Pucheu v. National Sur. Corp., 87 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. La. 1949); Brown v.
Quinn, 220 S.C. 426, 68 S.E.2d 326 (1951). For special problems arising in the uninsured motorist
coverage context see Hartzog v. Eubanks, 200 So. 2d 303 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 251 La.
45, 50, 202 So. 2d 656, 658 (1967), and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 450 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1970).
127. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 260.11(2) (Supp. 1969).
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However, joinder of insurers may be arguably improper when punitive
damages are sought against an insured since the inflammatory nature
of punitive claims might realistically tend to prejudice an insurer's
cause. 2 1 With the increasing number of accidents involving multiple
parties, the problems posed are significant. Nevertheless, it is submitted
that the liberal rules of procedure applicable to actions generally should
provide adequate means for joining and severing appropriate claims
and partiesY.9 Judicious use of third party practice should serve to
further the interests of eliminating multiple suits and circuity of action
while preserving the right to direct action.
6. Diversity Actions in Federal Courts.-Superimposed upon the
problem areas discussed throughout this section are some special
problems faced by the federal courts in entertaining direct actions.
First, Congress has limited the courts' jurisdiction to hear direct action
suits by providing that
. . . in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability
insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured is
not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the State
of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State by which the insurer has
30
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.Y

Thus if the insured's citizenship coincides with any of those of the
insurer, the federal courts will be closed to any direct action against
the insurer alone. By its own terms the above provision does not apply
when the action is brought against both insurer and insured, but
whether the court would retain jurisdiction if the insurer were later
dismissed as a party defendant has apparently not been decided.
However, one court has held that an action for declaratory judgment
brought by an insurer is not a direct action within the meaning of the
131
provisions quoted above.
Pleading and proving the jurisdictional amount presents a second
problem for plaintiffs in federal courts. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has held that the limits of liability on the insurance policy
rather than the amount of the plaintiff's claim determine the
128. See Benn v. Camel City Coach Co., 162 S.C. 44, 160 S.E. 135 (1931).
129. The following states, like Florida,-have rules of civil procedure patterned after the
federal rules: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming. The federal rules
themselves are in effect in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964) (emphasis added), criticized in Weckstein, The 1964
Diversity Amendment: CongressionalIndirect Action Against State "Direct Action" Laws, 1965
Wis. L. REV. 268.
131. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. LeBleu, 272 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. La. 1967).
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jurisdiction over the case.132 As a result, in any instance where the
policy sued on is for 10,000 dollars or less, no diversity suit will be
possible. 33 In addition, any insurer involved in a direct action against
multiple insurers is entitled to dismissal if its policy limit is 10,000
34
dollars or less.
A third area of difficulty is that of removal of direct actions from
state to federal courts. An early decision held that joining insurer and
insured in one action does not affect the removal process, 13 but a later
court would not permit the insurer to remove only the question of its
liability under the insurance policy. 136 Perhaps removal, when
appropriate, should encompass the entire claim rather than just a
portion of it.
Finally, several miscellaneous problems should be noted. Third
party practice, discussed at length in the preceding subsection, should
present less difficulty in view of the liberality of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and the decided cases so indicate. 137 Conflict of laws
questions, too, should present fewer problems inasmuch as the cases
cited in the preceding subsection seem to indicate a greater willingness
on the part of federal judges to apply other states' direct action
rights.' While the federal courts are bound by the state conflict of laws
rules, the Illinois experience demonstrates that this is not too great a
barrier. 39 It should be noted also that the first court to adopt
Shingleton was the United States District Court for the Southern
40
District of New York.
7. PretrialDiscovery.-Discovery of insurance matters has long
been a troublesome subject in the non-direct action context. As
Professor Moore observes, the decided cases are sharply and
irreconcilably in conflict. "' Most of the objections raised to the
discovery of insurance have been based upon the prejudice theory or
42
the belief that insurance is irrelevant to the merits of the case.
132.

Payne v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 266 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1959).

133. Id.
134. Dendinger v. Maryland Cas. Co., 302 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1962).
135. Daniel v. Burdette, 24 F. Supp. 218 (W.D.S.C. 1938).
136. Highway Ins. UnderNriters v. Nichols, 85 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Okla. 1949).
137. Taylor v. Fishing Tools, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 666 (E.D. La. 1967); Pucheu v. National
Sur. Corp., 87 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. La. 1949); Jordan v. Stephens, 7 F.R.D. 140 (W.D. Mo.
1945); Tullgren v. Jasper, 27 F. Supp. 413 (D. Md. 1939).
138. See cases cited notes 109-10, 118 supra.
139. See cases cited notes 110-12 supra.
140. Barrios v. Dade County, 38 U.S.L.W. 1111, 2393 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1970).

141.

4 J. MooRE,

142.

Id.
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26.16[3] (2d ed. 1969).
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However, with insurers joined as defendants, there is good reason to
argue that these objections are no longer tenable. It is submitted,
therefore, that full discovery of insurance matters should now be
permitted in cases applying Shingleton although precedent to the
4 3
contrary may remain influential.Y
8. The Insured as Nominal Defendant.-The possible effects of
direct actions on recognized immunities have already been discussed in
the subsection on defenses. As noted, the trend is markedly toward the
abolition of both charitable14 and sovereign' immunities. However,
their continued vitality,' either in whole or in part, still presents
potential difficulties in the application of Shingleton. Where
immunities are recognized, one effective solution to the problems posed
is to allow suit against the insured alone as a nominal defendant when
the immune entity carries liability insurance. Thus the insurer remains
ultimately liable to the extent of its policy limits although not required
or permitted to be joined as a defendant. The immune entity continues
in the suit as the apparent real party iri interest although actually its
4 follow
interest is "nominal." Idaho 47 and Tennessee"
this procedure
where sovereign immunity is a factor. As to certain charities,
Georgia,' Maryland, 50 Maine,"' Nebraska, 112 and Tennessee' permit
suit against the nominal defendant only. Illinois follows similar
procedure but does not limit the charities' liability to the amount of
54
insurance carried.
Besides this nominal defendant method, two other approaches are
followed. One is to hold that carriage of liability insurance does not
143.
144.
145.
146.

E.g., Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957).
Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967).
Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 231 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 1967).
See, e.g., Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967).
147. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-3505 (1961); Pigg v. Brockman, 79 Idaho 233, 314 P.2d 609

(1957).
148. McMahon v. Baroness Erlanger Hosp., 43 Tenn. App. 128, 306 S.W.2d 41, cert.
denied, 306 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Wilson v. Maury County Bd. of Educ., 42 Tenn. App. 315, 302
S.W. 2d 502, cert. denied, 302 S.W.2d 502 (1957).
149. Morehouse College v. Russell, 219 Ga. 717, 135 S.E.2d 432 (1964).
150. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 556A (Supp. 1969); Howard v. Bishop Byrne Council
Home, Inc., 249 Md. 233, 238 A.2d 863 (1968); McCormick v. St. Francis de Sales Church, 219
Md. 422, 149 A.2d 768 (1959); accord as to diversity actions, Sanner v. Trustees of Sheppard &
Enoch Pratt Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md.), affd, 398 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1968).
151. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 158 (Supp. 1970).
152. Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966).
153. McLeod v. St. Thomas Hosp., 170 Tenn. 423,95 S.W.2d 917 (1936).
154. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
(1965).
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permit suit against either the immune defendant or its insurer,' while
the second, followed by Arkansas and Louisiana, is to allow direct
action against the insurer notwithstanding its instred's immunity. 56 As
a result, a court faced with applying Shingleton to an immunity case
has these three alternatives. A resolution of the inherent problems in
such a situation is difficult, particularly since this may be one instance
where the prejudice theory is indeed viable. Of course its validity may
be dependent upon the extent of jury awareness that except for the
insurance there could be no recovery. Assuming such knowledge, if the
insurer is joined the jury will know that it will bear the entire loss; if
the insurer is not joined, the jury necessarily will speculate that an
insurance company remains ultimately liable. In either case the fact of
insurance coverage would be unavoidably apparent. If, however, a
general lack of public awareness of immunities is assumed, the
situation would be no different from any other case involving
insurance. It is submitted, therefore~that the best solution would be to
permit joinder of the immune entity's insurer so that all parties, claims,
liabilities, and issues would be frankly and openly before the court.
This may better serve the interests of all parties and, in this instance,
particularly those of the insurer.
9. Multiple Coverage, Pro Rata Payment and Subrogation.-Issues involving these troublesome topics probably will not be
greatly affected by direct actions via Shingleton, but the aboveboard
nature of the direct action itself will likely make them more apparent.
While direct action may serve to bring together all claims at once and
thus eliminate additional litigation, the complicated nature of issues of
this type may increase the complexity of particular suits beyond
acceptable limits. 57 Nevertheless, it is submitted that no reason is
apparent why the law relating to these subjects should be changed by
permitting the direct action.
10. Severance of Complex Claims.--It is to be expected that,
155. Schulte v. Missionaries of La Salette Corp. of Mo., 352 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1961);
Decker v. Bishop of Charleston, 247 S.C. 317, 147 S.E.2d 264 (1966).
156. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3240 (Repl. Vol. 1966); LA. REV. STAT. § 22:655 (Supp.
1970).
157. Reference to the following cases and materials should be of help in meeting those
problems which arise: Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 185 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1966);
Futch v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 246 La. 688, 166 So. 2d 274 (1964); Graves v. Traders & Gen.
Ins. Co., 200 So. 2d 67 (La. Ct. App. 1967), affd and amended, 252 La. 709, 214 So. 2d 116
(1968); Cotton v. Associated Indem. Corp., 200 So. 2d 78 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 251 La.
71, 203 So. 2d 88 (1967); 16 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d §§ 62:1-62:140 (R. Anderson ed. 1966);
Appleman, Overlapping Coverages in Liability Contracts; Subrogation, 13 VAND. L. REV. 897
(1960); 22 LA. L. REV.243, 255-56 (1961).
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particularly in view of what was said in the immediately preceding
subsection, cases will arise wherein the issues, parties, or claims will be
of such complicated nature as to unduly delay or hinder the trial as to
liability and damages. Severance for separate trial as suggested by
Shingleton15 1 presents a manageable solution to this problem, but
courts should take care to disallow the manufacture of subsidiary issues
intended to secure the insurer's dismissal from the main case. 5
Considering the flexibility afforded by modern rules of civil
procedure,y0 the courts should have little difficulty in dealing with the
problems thus posed.
V.

CONCLUSION

With the Shingleton decision the Supreme Court of Florida took
an unprecedented step forward. Wholly made of judicial cloth, the
direct action created by the court rests upon a broad-public policy
basis. The court recognized both the importance and pervasiveness of
automobile liability insurance in today's world and faced the issues
presented with commendable forthrightness. After considering all the
interests involved, it was determined that present realities require
holding that persons injured in automobile collisions are third party
beneficiaries of automobile insurance policies. In view of the
inconclusive evidence available, it is submitted that the court correctly
rejected the prejudice theory in favor of the countervailing interest of
openly joining and trying all related claims among interested parties.
The basic soundness of the decision should permit its extension
into other fields of liability insurance that are deeply affected with a
public interest.' Indeed, as shown in the section on the conflict of
laws, one court has already applied Shingleton to a suit in New York
against a general indemnity insurer.'6 2 Of critical importance in this
regard is the fact that the Supreme Court of Florida reached its
decision by means of the well-recognized legal vehicles of public policy,
third party beneficiary rights, and the real party in interest concept.
Though unique, the decision does not proceed upon any novel or
undeveloped ground. The court's own reasoning thus presents
158. 223 So. 2d at 720.
159. The court in Shingleton strongly intimated that even after severance the identities of
all parties and interests would still be disclosed at trial. Id.
160. See note 129 supra.
161. See note 71 supra for a discussion of two subsequent Florida appellate cases extending
Shingleton to property and homeowner's insurance.
162. Barrios v. Dade County, 38 U.S.L.W. 1111, 2393 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1970).
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acceptable alternative bases for its adoption or extension by other
jurisdictions. All that remains is for other courts to become convinced
of the need for direct action. Considering the increasingly crowded
court dockets and the interminable time necessary to prosecute
personal injury claims to conclusion, it can hardly be doubted that a
substantial need for relief exists. Although Shingleton will not provide
a complete solution for all problems, it is submitted that in view of the
policy values it is designed to promote, it certainly deserves significant
consideration in the development of a sound perspective toward the
resolution of the mounting crisis in personal injury litigation.
JASON GORDON REYNOLDS

